The Second Moroccan Crisis.
·
Perhaps both Germany and Britain had expected
too much. Or perhaps, with time, the negotiations could have laid the basis for
a better understanding. Instead, the Germans responded to the failure of these
talks with an action which would challenge Britain either to abandon its French
ally, or publically support it. The crisis blew up in April 1911 over morocco,,
when French troops were sent to the town of Fez following the outbreak of a
revolt.
·
Germany did have a real grievance over this French
action, which was in conflict with the Algeciras agreement of 1906. Even franc implied
that some compensation rom the French empire was appropriate. Unfortunately, the
German foreign minister, kiderlen, with his combative approach mishandled the situation.
·
In his hope of pulling off a ‘great stroke’ to
impress public opinion, he sent the gunboat panther to the port of Agadir in
southern morocco.
·
Ostensibly, his was to protect German citizens
in the area, although only one could be found. In reality it was intended as a
lever to win the whole of the French Congo as compensation for the French action.
·
Instead, kiderlen’s diplomacy went wrong/ France
broke off negotiations and Britain stood by its side, which developed into a
major anglo-german dispute.
·
In the face of what was regarded as German
intimidation, Lloyd George, the British chancellor of the exchequer, bluntly
warned Germany in a major speech that Britain’s interests were at stake. In
growing tensions the royal navy was put on alert; once again Britain had
diplomatically stood firmly by France, its entente partner.
·
In the end, the German government was not
prepared to force the issue and risk war. Instead, by the agreement in November
1911, it backed down and accepted a narrow strip of the French congo as
compensation and France secured its domination of morocco.
·
Little was gained by the episode and much was
lost.
·
Kiderlen may have enjoyed broad support from
conservatives for his patriotic bombast; yet, the political tension had sharply
increased, particularly between Britain and German.
·
The press in both countries stirred up hatred of
each other and pressed for further increases in arms expenditure.
·
German clumsiness had made things worse. Within a
year Britain and France had concluded a naval agreement whereby the royal navy
would concentrate in the north sea and the French in the Mediterranean.
·
This gave Britain an informal commitment to defend
eh French channel ports, which proved to be significant in 1914.
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